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The Future of Muslim Family Law in Western Democracies 
 




  When Anglican Archbishop Rowan Williams suggested that some 
“accommodation” of Muslim family law was “unavoidable” in England, he was 
bitterly criticized in the world press. But he was raising a whole series of hard but 
“unavoidable” questions about marital, cultural, and religious identity and practice 
in Western democratic societies committed to human rights for all.  This Article 
discusses those hard questions, with emphasis on the place of faith-based family 
laws in modern liberal societies. It briefly reviews the history of the law of 
marriage and religion in the West, including the liberalization movements of the 
last half century that have rankled many faith communities. It then analyzes the 
recent arguments for and against the accommodation of Shari’a family law in 
Western democracies, and compares those to the accommodation claims of 
Jewish and Christian communities. The Article suggests that one way forward is 
to consider the compromise struck between the state and religious communities 
regarding education, and the use of licenses and accreditation requirements to 
ensure a baseline of common education in public and religious schools, and a 
safeguard against abuses by religious officials. 
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Anglican Archbishop Rowan Williams set off an international firestorm on 
February 7, 2008 by suggesting that some accommodation of Muslim family law 
was “unavoidable” in England.  His suggestion, though tentative and qualified, 
prompted more than 250 articles in the world press within a month, the vast 
majority denouncing it.  England, his critics charged, will be beset by “licensed 
polygamy,” “barbaric procedures,” and “brutal violence” against women encased 
in suffocating burkas.  Muslim citizens of a Western democracy will be subject to 
“legally ghettoized” Muslim courts immune from civil appeal or constitutional 
challenge.  Consider Nigeria, Pakistan, and other former English colonies that 
have sought to balance Muslim Shari’a with the common law, other critics added. 
The horrific excesses and chronic human rights violations of their religious courts 
— even ordering the faithful to stone innocent rape victims for dishonoring their 
families — prove that religious laws and state laws on the family simply cannot 
coexist. Case closed.  
This case won’t stay closed for long, however.  The Archbishop was not 
calling for the establishment of independent Muslim courts in England, let alone 
the enforcement of Shari’a by English courts.  He was, instead, raising a whole 
series of hard but “unavoidable” questions about marital, cultural, and religious 
identity and practice in Western democratic societies committed to human rights 
for all.  What forms of marriage should citizens be able to choose, and what 
forums of religious marriage law should state governments be required to 
respect?  How should Muslims and other religious minorities with distinctive 
family norms and cultural practices be accommodated in a society dedicated to 
religious liberty and self-determination, and to religious equality and non-
discrimination?  Are legal pluralism and even “personal federalism” necessary to 
protect Muslims and other religious believers who are conscientiously opposed to 
the liberal values that inform modern state laws on sex, marriage, and family?  Is 
every constitutional accommodation of Muslim family law and Shari’a courts not a 
dangerous step on the slippery slope toward empowering a faith, some of whose 
leaders subvert the very democratic and human rights values that now offer them 
protection?  These and other hard questions are becoming “unavoidable” for 
many modern Western democracies with growing and diverse Muslim 
communities, each making new and ever louder demands. If current growth rates 
of Muslim communities in the West continue, a generation from now the Danish 
cartoon “crisis” is going to seem like child’s play. 
The chapters in this volume -- centered on Australia, Canada, England, 
and the United States -- have unpacked these questions with particular candor, 
acuity, and awareness of the high stakes involved.  Some authors deftly employ 
the sharp new tools of multiculturalism and post-modern liberal theory to carve 
out legal and cultural space for semi-autonomous Muslim minority communities 
in the West – something of a reverse millet system.  Others provide enlightening 
descriptions of the depth and diversity of Muslim laws and cultures, raising 
caveats about which of these sundry Muslim laws should govern these diaspora 
communities.  Others offer trenchant analysis of the serious constitutional and 
cultural implications of accommodating faith-based family laws like Shari’a, 
warning of the real dangers of maintaining dual religious and political sovereigns 
to govern domestic life.   
We learn from these chapters that these four democratic nations, despite 
their common law heritage and common commitment to human rights, have 
taken quite different approaches.  England, with the largest groups of Muslim 
minorities, has been the most accommodating of Muslim schools, charities, 
banks, and arbitration tribunals that govern the family, financial, and other private 
issues of their voluntary faithful.  In particular, English courts have regularly 
upheld the arbitration awards of Muslim tribunals in marriage and family disputes, 
so long as all parties consent to participate and so long as all arbitration takes 
places without physical coercion or threat. The same deference is accorded to 
the marital arbitrations of Jewish, Christian, Hindu, and other peaceable religious 
authorities.  Canada, though the most constitutionally liberal of these four 
nations, debated seriously the development of Shari’a marital tribunals in 
Ontario, but ultimately rejected religious arbitration in favor of a single provincial 
marriage law for its citizens.  Canadian Muslims, however, enjoy ample religious 
freedom to engage in their own worship, education, banking, and religious rituals 
and apparel.  Australia, with smaller and more scattered Muslim minorities, 
grants Muslims general religious freedom.  But it is only beginning to grapple with 
how to accommodate Muslim demands for state enforcement of Muslim marriage 
contracts and state deference to Muslim religious arbitration of family law and 
other disputes.  The United States, though with sizeable and diverse Muslim 
populations, has become the least accommodating of its Muslims citizens. Like 
Muslims in France, Turkey, and elsewhere, American Muslim litigants have not 
fared well of late when they have challenged state denials of charters or 
exemptions for their schools, charities, or mosques.  Nor have they often 
succeeded in challenging prohibitions to wear traditional religious apparel while 
teaching in public schools, testifying in state courts, or serving in public places.  
American states have also not readily accommodated Muslim family law, let 
alone Shari’a courts.  Most American state courts have only sporadically upheld 
private Muslim marriage contracts.  They have often sided with non-Muslim 
spouses in divorce and child custody cases involving mixed marriages.  They 
have held a firm line against Muslim polygamy, and have granted little deference 
to arbitration awards or mediation settlements by Muslim marital tribunals or 
religious officials.  But American Muslims have continued to agitate for greater 
religious freedom, autonomy, and self-determination in marriage and other 
subjects. 
B. The Evolution of the Law of Marriage 
It is no surprise that it is the law of marriage and family life that has 
triggered this new contest between law and religion in Western democracies.  
For marriage has long been regarded as both a legal and a spiritual institution – 
subject at once to special state laws of contract and property, and to special 
religious canons and ceremonies.  Marriage has also long been regarded as the 
most primal institution of Western society and culture.  Aristotle and the Roman 
Stoics called the marital household the “foundation of the republic” and “the 
private font of public virtue.”  The Church Fathers and medieval Catholics called 
it “the seedbed of the city,” “the force that welds society together.”  Early modern 
Protestants called it a “little church,” a “little state,” a “little seminary,” the first 
school of love and justice, charity and citizenship. John Locke and the 
Enlightenment philosophers called marriage “the first society” to be formed as 
men and women moved from the state of nature to an organized society 
dedicated to the rule of law and the protection of rights.   
 
Because of its cultural importance, marriage was also one of the first 
institutions to be reformed during the divisive battles between church and state in 
the history of the West.  In the fourth century, when Constantine and his imperial 
successors converted the Roman Empire to Christianity, they soon passed 
comprehensive new marriage and family laws predicated directly on Christian 
teachings.  In the later eleventh and twelfth centuries, when Pope Gregory VII 
and his successors threw off their civil rulers and established the Catholic Church 
as an independent legal authority, the church seized jurisdiction over marriage, 
calling it a sacrament subject to church courts and to the church’s canon laws. In 
the sixteenth century, when Martin Luther, Henry VIII, and other Protestants 
called for reforms of church, state, and society, one of their first acts was to reject 
the Catholic canon law of marriage and the sacramental theology that supported 
it, and to transfer principal legal control over marriage to the Christian magistrate.  
In the later eighteenth century, when the French revolutionaries unleashed their 
fury against traditional institutions, they took early aim at the Catholic Church’s 
complex marital rules, roles, and rituals, consigning marriage to the rule of 
secular state authorities.  And, in the early twentieth century, when the 
Bolsheviks completed their revolution in Russia, one of Lenin’s first acts was to 
abolish the legal institution of marriage, as a bourgeois impediment to the 
realization of true communism.  
 
Modern Western democracies have not abolished marriage as a legal 
category, but they have dramatically privatized it and thinned out many of its 
traditional elements.  Half a century ago, most Western states treated marriage 
as a public institution in which church, state, and society were all deeply 
invested.  With ample variation across jurisdictions, most Western states still 
generally defined marriage as a presumptively permanent monogamous union 
between a fit man and a fit woman with freedom and capacity to marry each 
other.  A typical state law required that engagements be formal and that 
marriages be contracted with parental consent and witnesses after a suitable 
waiting period.  It required marriage licenses and registration and solemnization 
before civil and/or religious authorities.  It prohibited sex and marriage between 
couples related by various blood or family ties identified in the Mosaic law. It 
discouraged, and sometimes prohibited, marriage where one party was impotent 
or had a contagious disease that precluded procreation or endangered the other 
spouse.  Couples who sought to divorce had to publicize their intentions, to 
petition a court, to show adequate cause or fault, to make provision for the 
dependent spouse and children.  Criminal laws outlawed fornication, adultery, 
sodomy, polygamy, contraception, abortion, and other perceived sexual offenses. 
Tort laws held third parties liable for seduction, enticement, loss of consortium, or 
alienation of the affections of one's spouse.  Churches and other religious 
communities were given roles to play in the formation, maintenance, and 
dissolution of marriage, and in the physical, educational, and moral nurture of 
children.  
Today, by contrast, a private contractual view of sex, marriage, and family 
life has come to dominate the West, with little constructive role left to play for 
parents or peers, religious or political authorities.  Marriage is now generally 
treated as a private bilateral contract to be formed, maintained, and dissolved as 
the couple sees fit.  Prenuptial, marital, and separation contracts that allow 
parties to define their own rights and duties within the marital estate and 
thereafter have gained increasing acceptance.  Implied marital contracts are 
imputed to longstanding lovers in some states, supporting claims for 
maintenance and support during and after the relationship.  Surrogacy contracts 
are executed for the rental of wombs. Medical contracts are executed for the 
introduction of embryos or the abortion of fetuses.  Requirements of parental 
consent and witnesses to the formation of all these contracts have all largely 
disappeared.  No-fault divorce statutes have reduced the divorce proceeding to 
an expensive formality, and largely obliterated the complex procedural and 
substantive distinctions between annulment and divorce.  Payments of alimony 
and other forms of post-marital support to dependent spouses and children are 
giving way to lump sum property exchanges providing a clean break for parties to 
remarry.  Court-supervised property settlements between divorcing spouses are 
giving way to privately negotiated or mediated settlements, confirmed with little 
scrutiny by courts.  The functional distinctions between the rights of the married 
and the unmarried couple and the straight and the gay partnership have been 
considerably narrowed by an array of new statutes and constitutional cases.  
Marriages, civil unions, and domestic partnerships have become veritable legal 
equivalents in many states. The roles of the church, state, and broader 
community in marriage formation, maintenance, and dissolution have been 
gradually truncated in deference to the constitutional principles of sexual 
autonomy, laicité, or church-state separation.  Traditional criminal prohibitions 
against most voluntary sexual conduct and contact, short of obscenity or child 
abuse, have become dead or discarded letters.  Traditional prohibitions against 
contraception and abortion have been held to violate the constitutional right of 
privacy. Traditional tort suits for sexual interference with one's spouse have 
become largely otiose. 
These exponential legal changes in the past half century have, in part, 
been efforts to bring greater equality and equity within marriage and society and 
to stamp out some of the patriarchy, paternalism, and plain prudishness of the 
past.  These legal changes are also, in part, simple reflections of the exponential 
changes that have occurred in the culture and condition of Western families -- the 
stunning advances in reproductive and medical technology, the exposure to 
vastly different perceptions of sexuality and kinship born of globalization, the 
explosion of international and domestic norms of human rights, the implosion of 
the traditional nuclear family born of new economic and professional demands on 
wives, husbands, and children.  But, more fundamentally, these legal changes 
represent the rise of a new theory of private ordering of the domestic sphere and 
the growth of a new “democracy of desire.”  A fantastic range of literature – 
jurisprudential, theological, ethical, political, economic, sociological, 
anthropological, and psychological -- has emerged in the past four decades 
vigorously describing, defending or decrying these legal changes.   
C. Muslim Responses and Arguments for Accommodation 
Many Muslims living in the West decry these massive changes to 
prevailing state laws of sex, marriage, and family -- and they want out.  Some 
Muslims have just gone back to their Muslim-majority homelands shaking their 
heads in dismay of what Western libertinism has wrought.  Others have stayed 
put and just quietly ignored the state’s marriage and family law, using the shelter 
of constitutional laws of privacy and sexual autonomy to become, in effect, a law 
unto themselves.  Others have developed elaborate premarital contracts that 
seek to exempt Muslim couples from much of the state law in favor of the internal 
norms and practices of their religious communities.  Still others have led bi-
cultural lives, dividing their time between Western homes and Muslim-majority 
lands that allow them to form Muslim marriages and families, including those that 
license polygamy, patriarchy, and primogeniture.   
All of these informal methods of cultural and legal coexistence, however, 
can only be temporary expedients.  Not only do some of these arrangements put 
in jeopardy many of the state’s rights and privileges for spouses and children that 
depend on a validly contracted marriage.  But these creaky accommodations and 
concessions that now exist in various Western lands can easily fall apart.  
Eventually a Muslim citizen will appeal to the state for relief from a marriage 
contract, religious family practice, or worship community that he or she cannot 
abide but cannot escape.  Eventually an imam or (shadow) Shari’a court will 
overstep by using force or issuing a fatwa that draws the ire of the media and the 
scrutiny of state courts.  Eventually, an aggressive state case worker or 
prosecutor will move upon a Muslim household, bringing charges of coerced or 
polygamous marriage.  Eventually, a Muslim school or charity will find itself in 
court faced with a suit for gender discrimination or with child abuse owing to its 
practice of corporal punishment and single-sex education.  Eventually, another 
major media event like that surrounding the Ontario Shari’a court of 2005 or the 
stray Rowan Williams comment of 2008 will bring a bright spotlight back on 
Western Muslim communities.  And, once such a major case or controversy 
breaks and the international media gets involved, many of these informal and 
temporary arrangements might well unravel – particularly given the cultural 
backlash against Muslims prompted by 9/11, 7/7, and now Fort Hood, or by the 
bloody wars against Islamicist extremists in Iraq, Afghanistan, and beyond.  
It is precisely this vulnerability that advocates of faith-based family law and 
Shari’a courts want to avert.  They want to put Shari’a, and its voluntary use by 
Muslim faithful, on firmer constitutional and cultural ground in the West.  Rather 
than denouncing Western liberalism, however -- and the sexual, moral, and 
marital lassitude it has occasioned --- sophisticated advocates now press their 
case for Shari’a in and on the very terms of Western constitutionalism and 
political liberalism.   
Part of the case for Shari’a is an argument for religious freedom.  Both 
Western constitutional laws and international human rights norms give robust 
protection to the religious freedom of individuals and groups.  Why should 
peaceable Muslim citizens not be given freedom to opt out of state laws on sex, 
marriage and family that run afoul of their core claims of conscience and central 
commandments of their faith?  Why should they not have the freedom to choose 
to exercise their domestic lives in accordance with the norms of their own 
voluntary religious communities?  Why doesn’t freedom of religion provide a 
sincere Muslim with protection against a unilateral divorce action or a child 
custody order by a state court that directly contradicts the rules of Shari’a?  Why 
doesn’t freedom of religious exercise empower a pious Muslim man to take four 
wives into his loving permanent care in imitation of the Prophet, particularly when 
his secular counterpart can consort and cavort freely with four women at once 
and then walk out scot free?  And, in turn, why shouldn’t Muslim religious 
authorities enjoy the autonomy and freedom to apply their own internal laws and 
procedures for guiding and governing the private domestic lives of their voluntary 
faithful?  Religious groups in the West have long enjoyed the corporate free 
exercise rights to legal personality, corporate property, collective worship, 
organized charity, parochial education, freedom of press, and more.  Why can’t 
Muslim religious groups also get the right to govern the marriage and family lives 
of their voluntary members -- particularly when such domestic activities have 
such profound religious and moral dimensions for Islamic life and identity. 
Part of the case for Shari’a is an argument for religious equality and non-
discrimination.  After all, many Western Christians do have religious tribunals to 
govern their internal affairs, including some of the family matters of their faithful, 
and state courts will respect their judgments even if their cases are appealed to 
Rome or Canterbury, Moscow or Constantinople.  No one is talking of abolishing 
these church courts, or trimming their power, even after recent discoveries of 
grave financial abuses and cover-ups of clerical sexual abuse of children in some 
churches.  No one seems to think these Christian tribunals are illegitimate when 
some of them discriminate against women in decisions about ordination and 
church leadership.  Similarly, Jews are given wide authority to operate their own 
Jewish law courts to arbitrate marital, financial, and other disputes among the 
Orthodox Jewish faithful.  Indeed, in New York State by statute, and in several 
European nations by custom, courts will not issue a civil divorce to a Jewish 
couple unless and until the beth din issues a religious divorce, even though 
Jewish law systematically discriminates against the wife’s right to divorce.  And 
again, Amish, Mennonites, Hutterites, and other ascetic religious minorities have 
been exempted from compliance with general laws concerning education, child 
labor, workplace and employment relations and more, and have had their laws of 
excommunication and banishment upheld by the courts.  If Christians can have 
their canon laws and consistory courts, if Jews can have their Halacha and beth 
din, and if even indigenous peoples can have their ancestral laws and tribal 
rulers, why can’t Muslims be treated equally in their use of Shari’a and Islamic 
courts?  
 
And part of the case for Shari’a is an argument from political liberalism.  
One of the most basic teachings of classic liberalism is that marriage is a pre-
political and pre-legal institution.  It comes before the state and its positive laws, 
both in historical development and in ontological priority.  As John Locke put it 
famously in Two Treatises on Government (1689), the marital contract was “the 
first contract” and “the first society” to be formed as men and women came forth 
from the state of nature. The broader social contract came later, presupposing 
stable marital contracts.  And contracts to form state governments, churches, and 
other voluntary associations within this broader society came later still.  Why, on 
this simple contractarian logic, should the state get exclusive jurisdiction over 
marriage?  After all, it was sixteenth-century Protestants, not eighteenth-century 
Enlightenment philosophers who first vested the state with marital jurisdiction.  
But why is state jurisdiction over marriage mandatory, or even necessary?  
Before the sixteenth-century Protestant Reformation -- and in many Catholic 
lands well after the Reformation, too -- the Catholic canon law and Catholic 
church courts governed marriage.  Moreover, even in Protestant England until 
the nineteenth century, the state delegated to ecclesiastical courts the power to 
treat many marriage and family questions.  There is evidently nothing inherent in 
the structure of Western marriage and family law that requires that it be 
administered by the state.  And there is nothing ineluctable in liberalism’s 
contractarian logic that requires marital couples to choose the state rather than 
their own families or their own religious communities to govern their domestic 
lives -- particularly when the state’s liberal rules diverge so widely from their own 
beliefs and practices.  On this latter argument, conservative Muslims sometimes 
join hands with selected conservative Christians and critical liberals who call for 
exemption from, or the abolition of, state marriage law – conservative Christians 
because the state has betrayed traditional Christian teachings on marriage, 
critical liberals because the state is encroaching on individual privacy and sexual 
autonomy. 
 
D. The Limits and Lessons of Accommodation 
The problem with the pro-Shari’a argument from religious freedom is that it 
falsely assumes that claims of conscience and freedom of religious exercise 
must always trump.  But this is hardly the case in modern democracies, even 
though religious freedom is cherished.  Even the most sincere and zealous 
conscientious objectors must pay their taxes, register their properties, answer 
their subpoenas, obey their court orders, swear their oaths (or otherwise prove 
their veracity), answer their military conscriptions (even if by non-combat duty),  
and abide by many other general laws for the common good that they may not in 
good conscience wish to abide. Their eventual choice if they persist in their 
claims of conscience is to leave the country or go to prison for contempt.  Even 
the most devout religious believer has no claim to exemptions from criminal laws 
against activities like polygamy, child marriage, female genital mutilation, or 
corporal discipline of wives, even if their particular brand of Shari’a commends it 
or if their particular religious community commands it.  The guarantee of religious 
freedom is not a license to engage in crime.  Muslims who are conscientiously 
opposed to liberal Western laws of sex, marriage, and family are certainly free to 
ignore them. They can live chaste private lives in accordance with Shari’a and 
not register their religious marriages with the state. That choice will be protected 
by the constitutional rights of privacy and sexual autonomy so long as their 
conduct is truly consensual.  But that choice also leaves their family entirely 
without the protections, rights, and privileges available through the state’s 
complex laws and regulations of marriage and family, marital property and 
inheritance, social welfare and more.  And if minor children are involved, the 
state will intervene to ensure their protection, support, and education, and will 
hear nothing of free exercise objections from their parents or community leaders.  
Western Muslims enjoy the same religious freedom as everyone else, but some 
of the special accommodations pressed by some Muslim advocates today in the 
name of religious freedom are simply beyond the pale for most Western 
democracies. 
 
Even further beyond the pale is the notion of granting a religious group 
sovereignty over the sex, marriage, and family lives of their voluntary faithful.  
Allowing religious officials to officiate at weddings, testify in divorce cases, assist 
in the adoption of a child, facilitate the rescue of a distressed family member, and 
the like are one thing.  Most Western democracies readily grant Muslims and 
other peaceable religious communities those accommodations.  Some 
democracies also will uphold the religious arbitration awards and mediation 
settlements over discrete domestic issues.  But that is a long way from asking the 
state to delegate to a religious group the full legal power to govern the domestic 
affairs of their voluntary faithful in accordance with their own religious laws.  No 
democratic state can readily accommodate a competing sovereign to govern 
such a vital area of life for its citizens – especially since family law is so 
interwoven with other state public, private, procedural, and penal laws, and 
especially since so many other rights and duties of citizens turn on a person’s 
marital and familial status. Putting aside the formidable constitutional obstacles to 
such a delegation of core state power to a private religious body, surely a 
democratic citizen’s status, entitlements, and rights cannot turn on the judgments 
of a religious authority that has none of the due process and other procedural 
constraints of a state tribunal.  Moreover, the proud claim of Muslim advocates 
that Shari’a provides a time-tested and comprehensive law governing all aspects 
of sex, marriage, and family life for the Muslim faithful is, for some, an even 
stronger strike against its accommodation.  Once a state takes the first step 
down that slippery slope, skeptics argue, there will eventually be little to stop the 
gradual accretion of a rival religious law over sex, marriage, and family life, 
particularly as Muslim communities grow larger and more politically powerful.  
Some Western states thus resist even religious arbitration and mediation of 
marital disputes by Muslim tribunals. 
 
The pro-Shari’a argument from liberal contractarian logic – since marital 
contracts are pre-political, coming before the contracts that form the society, the 
state, or religious associations, marital parties should be free to choose whose 
laws govern them -- is clever but incomplete.  It ignores another elementary 
teaching of classical liberalism, namely, that only the state and no other social or 
private unit can hold the coercive power of the sword.  The government contract 
does grant this coercive power over individuals but only in exchange for strict 
guarantees of due process of law, equal protection under the law, and respect for 
fundamental rights.  A comprehensive system of marriage and family law – let 
alone the many correlative legal systems of inheritance, trusts, family property, 
children’s rights, education, social welfare, and more -- cannot long operate 
without coercive power.  It needs police, prosecutors, and prisons, subpoenas, 
fines, and contempt orders, material, physical, and corporal sanctions.  Moral 
suasion and example, communal approbation and censure can certainly do part 
of the work.  But a properly functioning marriage and family law system requires 
resort to all these coercive instruments of government.  And only the state, not a 
religious body, can properly use these instruments in a modern democracy.   
 
The pro-Shari’a argument from religious equality and non-discrimination 
takes more effort to parry.  A useful starting point is the quip of United States 
Supreme Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.: “The life of the law has not been 
logic but experience.”1  This adage has bearing on this issue.  The current 
accommodations made to the religious legal systems of Christians, Jews, First 
Peoples, and others in the West were not born overnight.  They came only after 
decades, even centuries of sometimes hard and cruel experience, with gradual 
adjustments and accommodations on both sides.   
 
The accommodation of and by Jewish law to Western secular law is 
particularly instructive.2  It is discomfiting but essential to remember that Jews 
were the perennial pariahs of the West for nearly two millennia, consigned at 
 
1 The Common Law (1881), 1-2.  
2 The accommodation of the First Peoples of Canada, Australia, or the United States are simply 
not precedents for any others besides First Peoples.  These arrangements are products of 
ancient treaties worked out, in no small part, as compensation for massive atrocities and 
dislocation of native or aboriginal peoples committed during earlier colonial days.  The courts of 
all three lands have stated clearly that these accommodations and benefits are sui generis, not to 
be imitated by and for others. 
best to second class status, and periodically subject to waves of brutality – 
whether imposed by Germanic purges, medieval pogroms, early modern 
massacres, or the twentieth-century Holocaust.  Jews have been in perennial 
diaspora after the destruction of Jerusalem in 70 c.e., living in a wide variety of 
legal cultures in the West and well beyond.  One important legal technique of 
survival they developed after the third century c.e. was the concept of dina 
d’malkhuta dina (“the law of the community is the law”).  This meant that Jews 
accepted the law of the legitimate and peaceful secular ruler who hosted them as 
the law of their own Jewish community, to the extent that it did not conflict with 
core Jewish laws.  This technique allowed Jewish communities to sort out which 
of their own religious laws were indispensable, which more discretionary; which 
secular laws and practices could be accommodated, which had to be resisted 
even at the risk of life and limb.  This technique not only led to ample innovation 
and diversity of Jewish law over time and across cultures.  It also gave the Jews 
the ability to survive and grow legally even in the face of ample persecution.  
 
Western democracies, in turn -- particularly in the aftermath of the 
Holocaust and in partial recompense for the horrors it visited on the Jews – have 
gradually come to accommodate core Jewish laws and practices.  But it is only in 
the past two generations, and only after endless litigation and lobbying in state 
courts and legislatures, that Western Jews have finally gained legal ground to 
stand on, and even that ground is still thin and crumbles at the edges at times.  
Today, Western Jews generally have freedom to receive Sabbath day 
accommodations, to gain access to kosher food, to don yarmulkes, distinctive 
grooming, and other forms of religious dress in most public places, to gain 
zoning, land use, and building charters for their synagogues, charities, and Torah 
schools, to offer single-sex and bilingual education, and more.  And Jewish law 
courts have gained the right to decide some of the domestic and financial affairs 
of their faithful who voluntarily elect to arbitrate their disputes before them rather 
than suing in secular courts. These Jewish law courts are attractive to Jewish 
disputants, because they are staffed by highly trained jurists, conversant with 
both Jewish and secular law, and sensitive to the bicultural issues that are being 
negotiated.  Unlike their medieval and early modern predecessors, these modern 
Jewish law courts claim no authority over all of Jewish sex, marriage, and family 
life, leaving many such issues to the state.  These Jewish law courts have also 
abandoned their traditional authority to impose physical coercion or sanctions on 
the disputants; in particular, they claim no authority beyond persuasion to stop a 
disputant from simply walking out of court and out of the Jewish community 
altogether.   
 
The modern lessons in this story for Shari’a advocates are four.  First, it 
takes time and patience for a secular legal system to adjust to the realities and 
needs of new religious groups and to make the necessary legal 
accommodations. The hard-won accommodations that modern Jewish law and 
culture now enjoy are not fungible commodities that Muslims or any others can 
claim with a simple argument from equality. They are individualized, equitable 
adjustments to general laws that each community needs to earn for itself based 
on its own needs and experiences.  Muslims simply do not have the same history 
of persecution that the Jews have faced in the West, and simply do not yet have 
a long enough track record of litigation and lobbying.  Concessions and 
accommodations will come, but only with time, persistence, and patience. 
 
Second, it takes flexibility and innovation on the part of the religious 
community to win accommodations from secular laws and cultures.  Not every 
religious belief can be claimed as central; not every religious practice can be 
worth dying for.  Over time, and of necessity, diaspora Jewish communities 
learned to distinguish between what was core and what more penumbral, what 
was essential and what more discretionary to Jewish legal and cultural identity.  
Over time, and only grudgingly, Western democracies learned to accommodate 
the core religious beliefs and practices of Jewish communities.  Diaspora Muslim 
communities in the West need to do the same.  As several chapters in this 
volume have made clear, Islamic laws and cultures have changed dramatically 
over time and across cultures, and modern day Islam now features immense 
variety in its legal, religious, and cultural practices. That diversity provides ample 
opportunity and incentive for Muslim diaspora communities to make the 
necessary adjustments to Western life, and to sort out what is core and what is 
more discretionary in their religious lives.  Cultural adaptation, though not 
assimilation, is what is needed to win the accommodations of the state.  
 
Third, religious communities, in turn, have to accommodate, or at least 
tolerate, the core values of their secular host nations if they expect to win 
concessions for their religious courts and other religious practices.  No Western 
nation will long accommodate, perhaps not even tolerate, a religious community 
that cannot accept its core values of liberty, equality, and fraternity, or of human 
rights, democracy, and rule of law.  Those who wish to enjoy the freedom and 
benefits of Western society have to accept its core constitutional and cultural 
values as well.  So far, only a small and brave band of mostly Western-trained 
Muslim intellectuals and jurists have called for the full embrace of democracy and 
human rights in and on Muslim terms.  These are highly promising arguments.  
But so far these arguments can hardly be heard amidst all the loud denunciations 
of them from sundry traditional Muslims in and beyond the West.  Moreover, 
even liberal Muslims are hard pressed to point to modern examples of a Shari’a-
based legal system that maintains core democratic and human rights values.  
Until that case can be reliably made out, deep suspicion will remain the norm.  
Western-based Muslims have an ideal opportunity to show that Shari’a and 
democracy can co-exist and complement each other. 
 
Finally, Muslim tribunals must become more legally sophisticated and 
procedurally equitable to be both attractive to voluntary Muslim disputants and 
acceptable to secular state courts.  Like the Jewish beth din that sits in New York 
or London, the Muslim law court needs to be staffed by jurists who are well 
trained both in religious law and in secular law, and who maintain basic 
standards of due process and representation akin to those in secular courts or 
arbitration tribunals.  A single imam pronouncing legal judgments in an informal 
proceeding at the local mosque will get no more deference from a state court 
than a single priest or rabbi making legal pronouncements in a church or 
synagogue.  And, Western state courts will have little patience with claims that 
this lack of deference violates the religious liberty of the mosque or its imam and 
members.  The court’s suspicions will be the opposite: that the disputing parties 
who appeared before the imam either did not understand the full legal options 
available to them at state law, or were coerced to participate in the internal 
religious procedures.  It’s much harder for a court to have such suspicions when 
educated Muslim parties, eyes wide open, choose a legally sophisticated Muslim 
arbitration tribunal over a secular court that does not share their core values but 
still offers them a serious jurisprudential option to state marriage law.  
 
Lest the foregoing seems like an unduly patronizing argument for religious 
minorities to “wait-and-see” or “change-and-hope-for-the-best,” it’s worth 
remembering that majority Christians, too, went through much of the same 
exercise in the area of religion and education.  The American story offers a good 
illustration of how this developed, and how common educational standards were 
eventually raised and maintained.  In the later nineteenth century, a number of 
American states wanted a monopoly on education in public (that is, state run) 
schools.  Some of this agitation was driven by anti-Catholicism, some by anti-
religious animus altogether.  For half a century, churches, schools, and religious 
parents struggled earnestly to protect their rights to educate their children in their 
own private religious schools. In the landmark case of Pierce v. Society of Sisters 
(1925),3 the United Supreme Court finally held for the churches and ordered 
American states to maintain parallel public and private education options for their 
citizens.  But in a long series of cases thereafter, courts also made clear that 
states could set basic educational requirements for all schools – mandatory 
courses, texts and tests, minimal standards for teachers, students and facilities, 
common requirements for laboratories, libraries, gymnasia and the like.  
Religious schools could add to the state’s minimum requirements, but they could 
not subtract from them. Religious schools that sought exemptions from these 
requirements found little sympathy from the courts, which instructed the schools 
either to meet the standards or lose their accreditation and licenses to teach.  
This compromise on religion and education, forged painfully over more 
than half a century of wrangling, has some bearing on questions of religion and 
marriage.   Marriage, like education, is not a state monopoly, even if marriage 
law must be a state prerogative.  Religious parties in the West have long had the 
right to marry in a religious sanctuary, following their religious community’s 
preferred wedding liturgy.  Religious officials have long had the right to 
participate in the weddings, annulments, divorces, and custody battles of their 
voluntary members.  But the state has also long set the threshold requirements 
of what marriage is and who may participate.  Religious officials may add to 
 
3 268 US 510 (1925). 
these threshold state law requirements on marriage but not subtract from them. A 
minister may insist on premarital counseling before a wedding, even if the state 
will marry a couple without it.  But if a minister bullies a minor to marry out of 
religious duty, the state could throw him in jail.  A rabbi may encourage a 
bickering couple to repent and reconcile, but he cannot prevent them from filing 
for divorce.  An imam may preach of the beauties of polygamy, but if he 
knowingly presides over a polygamous union, he is an accessory to crime.   
If religious tribunals do eventually get more involved in marriage and 
family law, states might well build on these precedents and set threshold 
requirements in the form of a license – formulating these license rules through a 
democratic process in which all parties of every faith and non-faith participate.  
Among the most important license rules to consider: No child or polygamous 
marriages or other forms of marital union not recognized by the state.4 No 
compelled marriages or coerced conversions before weddings that violate 
elementary freedoms of contract and conscience.  No threats or violations of life 
and limb, or provocations of the same. No blatant discrimination against women 
or children. No violation of basic rules of procedural fairness, and more.  
Religious tribunals may add to these requirements but not subtract from them. 
Those who fail to conform will lose their licenses and will find little sympathy 
when they raise religious liberty objections.  
This type of arrangement worked well to resolve some of the nation’s 
hardest questions of religion and education.  And it led many religious schools 
slowly to transform themselves from sectarian isolationists into cultural leaders.  
Muslims in the West have already begun some of this exercise, too, in the 
development of grade and high schools, which are now sometimes attractive to 
non-Muslims because of their discipline and high academic standards.  This 
should continue, and eventually give rise to major colleges and universities on 
the order of Notre Dame, Brigham Young, Wheaton, or Pepperdine.   
Such an arrangement holds comparable promise for questions of religion 
and marriage in Muslims diaspora communities.  It not only prevents the descent 
to ‘licensed polygamy,’ ‘barbaric procedures’ and ‘brutal violence’ that the 
Archbishop’s critics feared. It also encourages today’s religious tribunals to 
reform themselves and the marital laws that they offer.  Even hardened and 
prejudiced local communities in democratic lands eventually will find room for 
new Muslim minorities who are skilled at “cultural navigation” and who are both 
consistent and persistent in pressing their main case for accommodation.  And, in 
the process of adjusting to the legal and cultural realities of their new homes, 
Muslim religious minorities may eventually become legal and cultural leaders in 
succeeding generations of the West.  
 
4 I put the case against religiously-based polygamy briefly in “The Legal Challenges of Polygamy 
in the USA,” Ecclesiastical Law Journal 11 (2009): 72 and at greater length in Why Two in One 
Flesh: The Western Case for Monogamy over Polygamy (forthcoming). 
